In her opening remarks to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearings on Ukraine on February 1st 2012, labelled “Ukraine at a Crossroads: What’s at Stake for the US and Europe?”, the US Senator for New Hampshire, Jeanne Shaheen, introduced Ukraine as one of the largest and most strategically located countries on the European continent, literally and figuratively lying “at the crossroads between Europe and Russia”. In a similar vein, she was followed with a testimony by Steven Pifer from the Brookings Institution, in Washington DC, criticising President Viktor Yanukovych’s domestic policies for seriously undermining Ukraine’s ability to balance its relationship “between the West and Russia”.

Balance or buffer zone?

“With weaker relations with the West,” Pifer argues, “Kyiv will find that it has less room for manoeuvre in its dealings with Moscow.” By stating that the overall goal of US and EU policy should be to face Yanukovych with the choice as clearly as possible and to crystallize the choice in his mind, Pifer strictly juxtaposes Ukraine’s friendlier and stronger relationship with what he calls “the West” on the one hand, and closer ties with Russia on the other hand. One could easily continue to enumerate examples where the US has posited that Ukraine has to balance its relations with East and West in terms of foreign and security policy. Considering such a black-and-white dichotomy, it is understandable why Ukraine is often denominated as a “grey zone” or “buffer zone”, and why Kanwal Sibal, an Indian diplomat and the first grand doctor of philosophy in India, might be right when he argued at the Kyiv Security Forum on April 20th 2012, that it will take a long time for the multi-polar world to become a reality.

The question is why buffer zones like Ukraine, keeping a safe distance between allegedly former enemies, have not disappeared since the fall of the Iron Curtain. One can agree with Steven Pifer that Ukrainian presidents and their administrations “have generally sought a balance in their foreign policy relationships between the West and Russia”. The balancing has been a common bone of content in mutual “West-Ukraine-Russia” relations. But one should also ask oneself whether the Ukraine has ever had another option but to balance and make such choices.

Who and why has nourished the realistic vision of the necessity to choose between the East and West? It is not just the United States. Politicians and commentators from all around the world continue to vehemently use the term “West” in their public appearances and keep the East-West dichotomy or some kind of “a neo-Cold War mythology” alive by referring to it directly or indirectly in international official and public discourse, ordinarily translated into concrete actions. Despite occasional showcases of US-Russia and EU-Russia reconciliation and attempts to build “strategic partnerships”, crucial decisions like voting on the UN Security Council resolutions and other important international moves such as building regional alliances have mostly reflected the traditional cleavage, with both sides are well aware of it. Behaviour of power hubs in the current EU’s Eastern neighbourhood in the realm of foreign and security policy, including energy security issues, is just one example.

On the one hand, the EU and Russia declare and make some steps to bind Ukraine closer to them (which tells us something about the genuineness of their growing together). On the other hand, neither of them is eager enough to solve the country’s integration impasse and neither the Euro-Atlantic community, nor Russia seems to have bothered the status-quo too much. On some occasions, their interaction inappropriately bypasses Ukraine. For instance, in relation to Russia’s pressure on Ukraine concerning the gas market and trade, Ukraine’s hopes of being supported by the EU-established and promoted Energy Community (of which Ukraine has become a full-fledged member) in negotiations with Moscow has not met with reality. What’s more, Russian alternative pipeline projects (South Stream and Nord Stream), backed by some political figures from the Energy Community member states, diminish the importance of Ukraine as an important energy transit country.

Two decades after the end of the Cold War, the choice Ukraine faces should not be posed as “between Europe and Russia” or “between the West and Russia”, in other words, between the Euro-Atlantic integration structures and counter-structures driven by Russia. After all, “[i]n many respects, this is a false choice”. However, for Ukraine not to choose and stay in-between with respect to the foreign, security and defence policy and alliances – the way Ukraine pursues through declaring a so-called “non-block status” of the country – is not only less meaningful but, taking into account the neo-Cold War hints, coming to terms with being “a buffer zone” for an infinite time might, in fact, be more dangerous.

The country insecure(d) 

In summer 2010, Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) officially abandoned the country’s aspirations to join NATO, in a move connected to the adoption of the law on fundamentals of Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy by Yanukovych’s administration. According to the law, Ukraine is claimed to be a European “non-bloc” (“non-aligned”) state, being interested in the continuation of a constructive co-operation with NATO rather than in membership. There have been numerous discussions on what this non-alignment means. I dare to claim that first and foremost, it is a rhetorical construct to avoid irritating NATO and Russia. Despite some Ukrainians’ (not only politicians’) wishful thinking, in no way does it imply neutrality of the country. Decision-makers have often behaved as if they were preparing to be integrated with “the West” and Russia at the same time, depending on the issue under discussion; they have checked what both sides are doing and reacted accordingly. By doing so, have they not themselves disproved the viability of their construct?

Another thing is, as one NATO official pointed out, if the non-bloc status meant neutrality, Ukraine should be prepared to defend itself alone. But “non-bloc status or neutrality is costly” and Ukraine cannot afford it – not only because of finances, but due to the geopolitics which (especially the incumbent) Ukrainian elites, strikingly enough, sometimes formulate as their device rather than a setback.

In other words, as Nicu Popescu stated at the Kyiv Security Forum, the Ukrainian government poses itself as being of crucial importance for all regional power hubs and expects them to “pay” for winning Ukraine’s favour. They tend to proudly overemphasize the geopolitical significance of the country and deem that Ukraine can live like Austria or Switzerland which are deep inside Europe and not on its outskirts. The question posed by the Ambassador and long-standing, continuously pro-EU figure in Ukrainian politics, Mr Tarasyuk, is thus very pertinent in this respect: “How can Ukraine, in a non-bloc manner, [and constrained in terms of hard security] resist the growing global challenges…?”

Despite official declarations that Yanukovych has made in terms of EU integration as a main objective of Ukraine’s foreign policy, the security guarantees provided by EU integration, or in the case of Ukraine, closer economic and political association with the EU, are primarily of a soft nature: strong interdependence, unshakeable respect for the rule of law, mutual trust and intensive co-operation, sharing, adherence to common rules, norms and values of democracy and free market economy, and a good portion of negotiation skills and diplomacy, above all that.

Diplomacy, or lack of it

Ukraine hardly falls into these categories. In fact, it faces substantial difficulties to go along EU-performed lines. There is an essential problem in Ukraine even with the last category – diplomacy – which could be nourished well, irrespective of the extent of association with the EU. The very basic of diplomacy is communication and generally, Yanukovych’s administration is somehow not capable of communicating properly. Ukrainian elites refuse to communicate and expose themselves to questions, open discussions and potential critical remarks, not only by individuals such as analysts and scholars from abroad but also to domestic interlocutors at lower levels of politico-societal hierarchies. With a few exceptions, they usually avoid making their contact details public or offering them personally. At the moment, Ukrainian diplomacy adhering to governmental structures is a master in showing disrespect to others.

A recent vivid example is the 5th Kyiv Security Forum in April 2012. Bernard Kouchner, Karel Schwarzenberg, Nicu Popescu, Kanwal Sibal and others from all around the world managed to come to Kyiv to discuss Ukraine’s state of affairs in an international context, but the incumbent Ukrainian officials who were meant to speak somehow did not. The Kyiv Security Forum thus went without “official Kyiv”. One can also recall numerous occasions where Ukraine’s state “cream of the crop” representatives have appeared, made statements, held dialogue with Brussels, Moscow and other capitals, but have caused outrage through their performance.

Paradoxically, it is Ukraine where such diplomacy aspires to manage the country’s impasse and guarantee its security with its skills alone.

Veronika Pulišová is a research assistant and PhD student at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations, Comenius University in Bratislava.

The author’s work has been supported by the Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund (SYLFF). She would also like to thank to Ms. Iryna Bochar and the Open Ukraine Foundation for inviting her to the 5th Kyiv Security Forum.

Article source: http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/317

DAY AFTER DAY
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Experts criticize the draft law that curtails rights of the environmental inspectors

Our government’s latest legislative activity does not seem to give the environmentalists a moment’s peace. The public has just cooled down after reacting to the Party of Regions initiative to authorize the officials to edit the Red Book of Ukraine, when the justice department prepared amendments to the legislation that might affect the further destiny of Ukraine’s natural resources. It is the draft law No. 10218 of March 16, 2012, “On Amendments into Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine (as for Optimization of Authorities of Central and Local Executive Bodies in the Sector of Environment and Natural Resources)” submitted by MP of Ukraine Yurii Miroshnychenko. This draft law was followed by mass protests among the environmental NGOs. Environmentalists think that the proposed amendments will give an absolute freedom of action to poachers, who became very numerous in Ukraine lately.

“Every year about 150,000 poachers are detained in Ukraine. I think, there is a hundred of them that were not caught for every one that was. And they cause the decrease in the variety of species of animals and plants. Poaching is the reason why so many animals appeared in the Red Book,” says ecologist and head of the Kyiv Ecological and Cultural Center Volodymyr Boreiko. “Today all the activity directed at fighting poaching is the responsibility of the State Environmental Inspection, which has offices in every oblast and raion. Inspectors who work there are doing a bit of a superhero’s job: they are constantly exposed to danger (there are cases of injuries and even fatalities) while catching the law violators, and they do this for a rather small salary. They cannot catch every single poacher because there are not enough of inspectors, and they lack the required means of transportation, for example, helicopters, which poachers do have. But nevertheless, they become a live wall between the nature and those who destroy it.”

The public keeps to the thought that soon Ukraine may end up in a situation when there will be no one to catch the poachers, so they will not be afraid of being punished at all. According to the legislative acts that are still used by the inspectors of the central office of the State Environmental Inspection as well as oblast and raion departments, they have a right to draw up formal reports and impose fines while arresting poachers (Article 255). The amendments offered by the justice department will take these rights away.

“This draft law breaks the whole environmental protection system of Ukraine, including the right of the State Environmental Inspection to make records of the law breakers. Only one word was changed in the text of the law. Right now it says that the reports can be drawn up by ‘the representatives of the executive bodies entitled to controlling activities.’ In other words, by the employees of the State Environmental Inspection. Now they put the word ‘central’ in front of ‘executive bodies.’ And there are 15 inspectors in the central body, who now have to catch poachers in the whole country. It is clearly impossible. Another part of amendment is going to take away the right to impose fines on poachers. In order to impose a fine, the report should be taken to Kyiv now [and before that, the inspector should be summoned. – Author],” says independent ecologist Oleh Lystopad.

So, if these amendments are adopted, soon enough poaching tools will be available for purchase at every market in Ukraine, while today the environmental inspectors at least have a right to confiscate and destroy them. But the main thing is that the adoption might lead to even greater extinction of the rare species (and not only the rare ones), and we are going to end up in a country where poaching is legal. The environmental NGOs jointly with the environmental inspectors wrote letters to the president of Ukraine and the heads of all the factions in the Verkhovna Rada: the public demands for this draft law to be dismissed from consideration. They offer to make amendments in a civilized way: let the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine work on it, submit it for the consideration of the Cabinet of Ministers, these things were not done yet. Besides, the ecologists informed that neither Chief Legal Administration of the Verkhovna Rada, nor its Committee on Environmental Policy gave a positive review of the amendments offered.

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• The necessity of NATO
• Once again on “reasonable defence,”
• On the Egyptian style

Comments:

Article source: http://www.day.kiev.ua/228287

Crimean Tatars: Report Presented to European Commission

A new report has been presented to the European Commission in Brussels, which criticises Ukraine for its lack in progress in creating a sustainable democracy and judicial system. The report also highlights instances of discrimination and injustice against minority groups including the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine. 

Below is an article published by the Kiev Post:

Ukraine has been sharply criticized by Brussels in the sphere of political dialogue and reform in the European Neighbourhood Policy Country Progress Report on Ukraine that was presented in Brussels on May 15 [2012].

“The area of deep and sustainable democracy experienced a further deterioration in 2011. Several leading opposition figures, including former Prime Minister [Yulia] Tymoshenko, were subjected to selective justice, characterised by un-transparent judicial processes. Successfully addressing the issue of selective justice would open the way to the signature and ratification of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU,” reads the report.

The document also reads that although “a new law on parliamentary elections was approved with an overwhelming cross party majority, but it failed to take fully into account all of the recommendations from the Venice Commission.”

“The authorities are increasingly hostile to public displays of discontent and on occasions have tried to limit freedom of assembly. Concerns are also expressed regarding the future of media freedom,” reads the report.

In addition, according to Brussels, “despite the adoption of a National Anti-Corruption Strategy in October, corruption perception remains high. Conditions for business and investment have further deteriorated.”

The EU also expressed concern over reports on “cases of discrimination on the basis of nationality or ethnic origin continue.”

“Roma, Crimean Tatars, as well as other minority groups are affected,” reads the document.

At the same time, Ukraine continued to participate very constructively in the work of the EU Border Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). In December, the Ukrainian government approved of the long-awaited decision to authorise joint patrolling of the border between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova.

Article source: http://www.unpo.org/article/14292

Date: 16 May 2012

Veronika Pulišová, a Slovakian analyst, asks the question in New Eastern Europe: If the Cold War is over, why is there still a country “between Europe and Russia”?

Ukraine is still being referred to as a country “between Europe and Russia” not only in ordinary public discourse and media but by top officials and diplomats, those in the US, EU and Russia, first and foremost, but also in Ukraine itself. Why there is such an “in-betweenness”, two decades after the end of the Cold War?

In her opening remarks to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearings on Ukraine on February 1st, 2012, labelled “Ukraine at a Crossroads: What’s at Stake for the US and Europe?”, the U.S. Senator for New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen introduced Ukraine as one of the largest and most strategically located countries on the European continent, literally and figuratively lying “at the crossroads between Europe and Russia”. In a similar vein, she was followed by a testimony by, Steven Pifer from the Brookings Institution, in Washington DC, criticising President Viktor Yanukovych’s domestic policies for seriously undermining Ukraine’s ability to balance its relationship “between the West and Russia”.

Balance or buffer zone?

“With weaker relations with the West,” Pifer argues, “Kyiv will find that it has less room for manoeuvre in its dealings with Moscow”. By stating that the overall goal of the US and the EU policy should be to face Yanukovych with the choice as clearly as possible and to crystallize the choice in his mind, Pifer strictly juxtaposes Ukraine’s friendlier and stronger relationship with what he calls “the West” on the one hand, with closer ties with Russia on the other hand. One could easily continue to enumerate examples where the US posited that Ukraine has to balance its relations with East and West in terms of foreign and security policy. Considering such a black-and-white dichotomy, it is understandable why Ukraine is often denominated as a “grey zone” or “buffer zone”, and why Kanwal Sibal, an Indian diplomat and the first grand doctor of philosophy in India, might be right when he argued at the Kyiv Security Forum on April 20th 2012, that it will take a long time for the multi-polar world to become a reality.

The question is why buffer zones like Ukraine, keeping a safe distance between allegedly former enemies, have not disappeared after the fall of the Iron Curtain. One can agree with Steven Pifer that Ukrainian Presidents and their administrations “have generally sought a balance in their foreign policy relationships between the West and Russia”. The balancing has been a common bone of content in mutual “West-Ukraine-Russia” relations. But one should also ask oneself whether the Ukraine has ever had another option but to balance and make such choices.

Who and why has nourished the realistic vision of a necessity to choose between the East and West? It is not just the United States. Politicians or commentators from all around the world continue to vehemently use the term “West” in their public appearances and keep the East-West dichotomy or some kind of “a neo-Cold War mythology” alive by referring to it directly or indirectly in international official and public discourse, ordinarily translated into concrete actions. Despite occasional showcases of the U.S.-Russia, EU-Russia reconciliation or attempts to build “strategic partnerships”; crucial decisions like voting on the UN Security Council resolutions and other important international moves like building regional alliances have mostly reflected the traditional cleavage, while both sides are well aware of it. Behaviour of power hubs in the current EU’s Eastern neighbourhood in the realm of foreign and security policy, including energy security issues, is just one example.

On the one hand, the EU and Russia declare and make some steps to bind Ukraine closer to them (that tells us something about genuineness of their growing together). On the other hand, neither of them is eager enough to solve the country’s integration impasse and neither the Euro-Atlantic community, nor Russia seems to be bothered the status-quo too much. On some occasions, their interaction inappropriately bypasses Ukraine. For instance, in relation to Russia’s pressure on Ukraine concerning the gas market and trade, Ukraine’s hopes of being supported by the EU-established and promoted Energy Community (of which Ukraine has become a full-fledged member) in negotiations with Moscow has not met with reality.What is more, Russian alternative pipeline projects (the South Stream and the Nord Stream) backed by some political figures from the Energy Community member states diminish the importance of Ukraine as an important energy transit country.

Two decades after the end of the Cold War, the choice Ukraine faces should not be posed as “between Europe and Russia” or “between the West and Russia”, in other words, between the Euro-Atlantic integration structures and counter-structures driven by Russia. After all, “[i]n many respects, this is a false choice”. However, for Ukraine not to choose and stay in-between as to the foreign, security and defence policy and alliances – the way Ukraine pursues through declaring a so-called “non-block status” of the country – is not only less meaningful but, taking into account the neo-Cold War hints, coming to terms with being “a buffer zone” for an infinite time might be more dangerous, as a matter of fact.

The country insecure(d)

In the summer 2010, Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s Parliament) officially abandoned the country’s aspirations to join NATO, the move connected to the adoption of the law on fundamentals of Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy by Yanukovych’s administration. According to the law, Ukraine is claimed to be a European “non-block” (“non-aligned”) state, while being interested in the continuation of a constructive co-operation with NATO rather than in membership. There have been numerous discussions on what this non-alignment means. I dare to claim that first and foremost, it is a rhetorical construct to avoid irritating NATO and Russia. Despite some Ukrainians’ (not only politicians’) wishful thinking, in no way it implies neutrality of the country. Decision-makers have often behaved as if they were preparing to be integrated with “the West” and Russia at the same time, depending on the issue under discussion; they have checked for what both sides are doing and reacted accordingly. By doing so, have not they themselves been disproving a viability of their construct?

Another thing is, as one NATO official made the point, if the non-bloc status meant neutrality, Ukraine should be prepared to defend itself alone. But “non-bloc status or neutrality is costly” and Ukraine cannot afford it – not only because of finances but due to the geopolitics which (especially the incumbent) Ukrainian elites, strikingly enough, sometimes formulate as their device rather than a setback.

In other words, as Nicu Popescu stated at the Kyiv Security Forum, the Ukrainian government poses itself as being of crucial importance for all the regional power hubs and expects them to “pay” for winning Ukraine’s favour. They tend to proudly overemphasize the geopolitical significance of the country and deem that Ukraine can live like Austria or Switzerland which are deep inside Europe and not on its outskirts. The question posed by the Ambassador and long-standing, continuously pro-EU figure in Ukrainian politics, Mr. Tarasyuk, is thus very pertinent in this respect: “How can Ukraine, in a non-bloc manner, [and constrained in terms of hard security] resist the growing global challenges…?”

Despite official declarations that Yanukovych has made in terms of EU integration as a main objective of Ukraine’s foreign policy; the security guarantees provided by the EU integration, or, for this moment in case of Ukraine, closer economic and political association with the EU, are primarily of a soft nature: strong interdependence, unshakeable respect for the rule of law, mutual trust and intensive co-operation, sharing, adherence to common rules, norms and values of democracy and free market economy, and a good portion of negotiation skills and diplomacy, above all that.

Diplomacy, or lack of it

Ukraine hardly falls into these categories. In fact, it faces substantial difficulties to go along the EU-performed lines. There is an essential problem in Ukraine even with the last category – diplomacy – which could be nourished well, irrespective of the extent of association with the EU. The very basic of diplomacy is communication and generally, Yanukovych’s administration is somehow not capable of communicating properly. Ukrainian elites refuse to communicate and expose themselves to questions, open discussions and potential critical remarks not only by individuals such as analysts and scholars from abroad but also to domestic interlocutors at lower levels of politico-societal hierarchies. With a few exceptions, they usually avoid making their contact details public or offering them personally. At the moment, Ukrainian diplomacy adhering to the governmental structures is a master in showing disrespect to others.

A recent vivid example is the 5th Kyiv Security Forum in April 2012. Bernard Kouchner, Karel Schwarzenberg, Nicu Popescu, Kanwal Sibal and others from all around the world managed to come to Kyiv to discuss Ukraine’s state of affairs in an international context but the incumbent Ukrainian officials meant to speak somehow did not. The Kyiv Security Forum thus went without “official Kyiv”. One can also recall numerous occasions where Ukraine’s state “cream of the crop” representatives have appeared, made statements, held dialogue with Brussels, Moscow and other capitals, but have caused an outrage by their performance.

Paradoxically, it is Ukraine where such diplomacy aspires to manage the country’s impasse and guarantee its security with its skills alone.

Veronika Pulišová is a research assistant and PhD student at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations, Comenius University in Bratislava.

The author’s work has been supported by the Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund (SYLFF). She would also like to thank to Ms. Iryna Bochar and the Open Ukraine Foundation for inviting her to the 5^th Kyiv Security Forum.

http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/317

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Article source: http://www.cogo-news.eu/news_Between-Europe-and-Russia-still_1917.html

On May 14 at the conference hall of hotel “Londonskaya” the VI International Conference “Freight and Ports of the Azov-Black Seas Basin” took place.

Among the participants there were representatives from Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Israel, Britain, Austria, Switzerland, Canada, Egypt, Norway, Romania, the Netherlands and other countries. Organizers – “Business Forum” company, “Industrial cargoes” magazine, IA “Metal-Courier.” The general partner is the port of Odessa.

Before the beginning of the forum the General Manager of the port of Odessa Yuriy Vaskov welcomed the guests:

“Despite the crisis and post-crisis periods the cargo turnover volumes in 2011 increased in domestic ports,” said Mr. Vaskov. “The credit for increase is shared by both public and private ports and terminals that are currently handle 40 percent of cargoes. Consequently, the market is growing for freight and transport companies.”

“I want to remind that Ukraine is on the threshold of reform of port industry: we expecte adoption of the Law “On Sea Ports” in the nearest future. The main purpose of this Act is not privatization, as many mistakenly believe, but to provide opportunities for investors to enter the Ukrainian ports on terms of concession. This will allow investing in infrastructure development, respectively, in the Ukrainian ports and attracting additional cargoes.”

“Many domestic companies and neighboring countries expect the adoption of the Act, to obtain a concession of port facilities and increase cargo base. For us, the port workers, it means an increase in cargo handling, transport streams, passing through the territory of Ukraine. The prospects on my opinion are positive. The main thing is not to lose time to participate actively in the forthcoming reforms. I wish you all success, share experience, which then can be used in practice.”

The conference program includes analysis of dry cargo market of the Black and Azov Seas basin, the market of bulk, grain cargoes, a review of exports of ferrous metals in the Black Sea, the consideration of the potential of container shipping on the Black Sea and its connection with the container shipping market on the Mediterranean Sea and other issues.

Dredging Today Staff, May 16, 2012; Image: port.odessa

Article source: http://www.dredgingtoday.com/2012/05/16/ukraine-londonskaya-hosts-vi-international-ports-conference/

Editor’s Note: The following is an English-language transcript of Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov’s speech before the European Parliament in Brussels on May 16.

Let me start by extending my thanks to all present and for your interest in the promotion of good relations between Ukraine and the European Union. Please allow me as well to express my special gratitude to our partners in the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats for the organisation of today’s meeting.

In my speech I would like to describe briefly the results we have managed to achieve over the last two years, but also focus on what still needs to be done. I understand only too well that many of you present here today are concerned about developments in the domestic political situation in Ukraine, and I am ready to discuss these issues later. It is en vogue these days to criticise Ukraine, and to let rip short-term emotions and long-held stereotypes. The image of Cato the elder, the Roman Commander, and his famous bywords ’Carthage must be destroyed’ come readily to mind.

Isolation, denial of political contacts, or their suspension – all lead to a dead-end, and as such are not among the choices we should make. I have always been and continue to be of the opinion that dialogue is the sole means of resolving pressing problems. I, as the Prime Minister of Ukraine, stand ready to discuss the most difficult problems in our relationship.

It is no secret that the current state of Ukraine’s relations with the European Union is far from the best it can be.

The very wide spectrum of our previous relations has narrowed to become hostage to just one sole issue. This is both counter-productive and short-sighted. It is perhaps not worthwhile going over old ground, noting how previous Ukrainian administrations, busying themselves with squabbles and feuds, failed to undertake any reforms.

We, those who live in Ukraine, are well aware of this.

At the same time, it is worth emphasising that our political opponents would very much like Europe to forget about the series of reforms that we have achieved: – the Association Agreement, which is unprecedented in its importance and is the fruit of efforts over many years by Ukrainian and European politicians and experts; – the Initiative, undertaken by the President of Ukraine, to form the Constitutional Assembly as the first step towards constitutional reform, the foundation of modernisation of the Ukrainian state; – the reform of criminal justice, and adoption of the new Criminal Procedure Code; – the reform of the judicial administration (law courts) to move away from the post-Soviet legacy and implement new European standards.

(Reforms include texts on the 2legal profession and legal practice and on the independence of the judiciary. The working group on judicial reform, set up by the President of Ukraine, is also developing a draft on public prosecutor’s office); – the legislative confirmation of Ukraine’s European aspirations into our national ‘Law on the principles of domestic and foreign policy of Ukraine’.

These are the most important steps, but that are many more – all undertaken thanks to our political will. In just a little over two years we have managed to achieve more in conducting reform than over the previous twenty years of Ukraine’s independence. It is precisely this record that exasperates our political opponents. They clearly understand that if they fail to find ways to undermine stability in Ukraine today, tomorrow they will struggle to remain on the political scene. Adoption of anti-corruption legislation and efficient implementing mechanisms are allowing us to fight corruption systematically.

As you are undoubtedly aware, an absolute majority in the parliament approved new election laws. Our absolute priority is to conduct elections to Ukrainian Parliament on 28 October in line with international democratic standards.

I would like to emphasise the absolute openness of the election process for international observers, whom we have already invited. We invite you to come, observe, and verify how democratic our election process is. This is vital for us to ensure the legitimacy of the election results.

We as establishing new relationships between the authorities and civil society, as stipulated in the new ‘Law on social organisations’, and by the State Policy Strategy for civil society development, approved by the President of Ukraine. A draft law on the right to peaceful assembly (meetings, rallies or demonstrations) is being updated in the parliament according to the conclusions of the Venice Commission. The ‘Law on access to public (open) information’ allows society to control the activities of government bodies. We have restored the Ukrainian economy to its previous state after the most severe crisis. In 2011, GDP growth amounted to 5.2%, industrial growth reached 7.3%, and inflation was 4.6%, the latter indicator being the lowest in the last nine years. These results were achieved against the backdrop of the deep economic crisis in Europe, the highest ever gas prices, and the absence of IMF financial support.

The recent adoption of new Tax and Customs Codes substantially improves the investment and business climate in Ukraine. We do recognise that we still face many problems, but the most important steps have now been taken. All of the above reforms provide incentives to business development and brought new revenues to the State Budget. State Budget revenues in 2011 were 31% more than in 2010. We have also implemented the system of automatic refunds for VAT. In 2011, taxpayers were automatically refunded around UAH 16 billion, which is almost one third of the total volume of refunds. We will continue to improve on this mechanism.

Timely VAT refunding remains one of the Government’s priorities. Measures undertaken to improve investment climate have resulted in the increase of foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI increased by 10% in 2011, and amounted to USD 49.36 billion. A significant growth in investments was registered from EU countries. The management of public (state) finances is being improved. It includes medium-term planning, budgetary expenditures optimisation and state debt management. In October 2011, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) stopped its monitoring of Ukraine. Negotiations with the International Monetary Fund are underway regarding cooperation under the Standby Arrangement (the IMF mission to Ukraine is planned to take place from May 21 to May 28). Ukraine has met practically all the programme conditions with the exception of raising gas and housing-utility prices, which are very sensitive issues for the Ukrainian people. The Government is currently seeking mutually-acceptable mechanisms to resolve these issues. The Cooperation Council meeting of yesterday provides more proof of the ambitious agenda in our bilateral relations. Key objectives are involved here. These include signing the Association Agreement, mutual access to markets within deep and comprehensive free trade area and the introduction of a visa-free regime for short-term trips by Ukrainian citizens to the EU.

Ukraine’s development over the next decade depends on whether we progress along each of the stated directions. Unfortunately, our strategic advance in relationships with the EU took place as Europe and the rest of the world had to face a series of new challenges. These include institutional changes in the EU, austerity measures to overcome the Eurozone financial crisis, and developments in the Middle East and Northern Africa. Many people call this current crisis the most complicated one in the history of the European Union. At the same time, and let me emphasise this again, Ukraine’s choice of European integration has been confirmed and consolidated in our legislation, and we shall not turn off this road. The EU remains the best integration project and path towards development for all of its partners. The EU expansion process continues despite the current crisis, and last December’s signing of the Accession Agreement with Croatia is the best evidence of this continuing process. The Croatian example inspires Ukraine.

The key objective along this road is now to ensure the early signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU, already initialed on 30 March in Brussels. It is not only political elites who are greatly interested in witnessing this signature. Business circles are also committed and increasingly voice their opinion openly from Kyiv, Brussels, and from other important European capitals. The Association Agreement for us also serves as a comprehensive road-map for modernisation of Ukraine, for the development of civil society, and for the operation of an open and liberal economy. We are undertaking as many responsibilities and commitments as other EU candidate countries, and in the integration process, we hope for adequate support from our European partners. We have begun the step-by-step integration of Ukraine into the EU internal market – a market of practically unlimited opportunities for the Ukrainian economy.

But Ukraine too represents an enormous market for European business. Our country also offers natural resources, a highly-educated work force and a strong scientific tradition. We have already begun preparatory work for the implementation of the Association Agreement, which includes both the Government’s approval of both an action plan and agenda for the adaptation of Ukrainian legislation to EU requirements. We are also ready to take the priority steps envisaged in the 2011 EU recommendations to Ukraine as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

The next objective is the introduction of visa-free regime with the EU, which will serve as the best example of European integration by bringing advantages to millions of individual Ukrainians. The Action Plan on EU visa liberalisation regime for Ukraine is identical, content-wise to the ‘road-maps’ of the Western Balkans countries. They all mean not only the notion of free movement of people, but also the introduction of European standards in the sphere of justice and freedom as well. We have already approved over 90% of the legal documents necessary to finalise the first ‘legislative’ stage of the Action Plan. Draft texts covering biometric passports, the fight against discrimination and personal data protection will soon be discussed by the Ukrainian parliament.

Ukraine takes an active part in the energy community and meets its responsibilities on reforming and ensuring that the energy sector functions in line with European standards. Amendments to the ‘Law on pipeline transport’ allow for reforms in the oil and gas sector. Equal access to the Ukrainian gas-transportation system is ensured for participants in the natural gas market when either transiting energy to Europe, or selling them within the Ukrainian domestic market. We are ready to cooperate most actively with the EU and European energy companies on setting up a gas consortium to manage the Ukrainian gas-transportation system jointly with the Russian Federation. We intend to promote integration in other sectors, including transport, the environment and healthcare. To sum up our achievements, it is possible to say that many topics that used to be simply Euro-rhetoric have now become a reality.

I would like to stress again that in a little over two years we have managed to achieve more than in the previous twenty years since Ukraine’s independence. As the Head of the Party of the Regions, I remain certain that our efforts to reform the country will in time be duly recognised – by both the Ukrainian people and the European Union. Great accomplishments are often better appreciated from a distance. I am convinced that we shall overcome temporary difficulties created by our political opponents, unscrupulously misinforming and deluding you, using certain corresponding manipulative techniques and hired provokers-professionals.

We have never stepped back from conducting a dialogue with you on any “sensitive issue” of the agenda. It is clear that the status of s politician, member of parliament or even former prime minister must not be used as an excuse to commit crimes.

Our government has initiated many legal proceedings against corrupt officials.

Only a small percentage of these have been introducedagainst the so-called opposition.

Investigations are under way against dozens of officials who came to power together with our own political party.

We do support the need to differentiate between political and criminal responsibility in line with European standards. In the case of Yulia Tymoshenko, not all defende procedures have been exhausted. The High Specialized Court of Ukraine is considering the appeal lodged on May 15. I would also like to stress that Ms Tymoshenko’s health remains under constant attention.

We took the unprecedented decision to invite foreign experts to conduct her medical examination and treatment in the Kharkov hospital. According to the German doctors, this hospital has all the necessary facilities.

Ladies and Gentlemen, In response to the main question of today’s conference, please allow me to express my certainty that Ukraine, with the active support of the EU, or even without such a support, continues its consistent progress towards European integration. This is our choice, supported by the Ukrainian people.

It would be nice to progress hand-in-hand with the EU, to benefit from the European perspective, and to enjoy its political and financial support. But as the saying goes, the more difficult the path, the more precious and valuable the result. Responding to some of my colleagues in the European institutions and their remarks to the media, I would like to say that here, in Europe, I do not feel an alien – Ukraine is part and parcel of Europe, it is an important integral component. Let me emphasize once again that we are all in favour of dialogue, no matter how difficult that dialogue. And it is with the purpose of dialogue that I am here in Brussels today.

Thank you for your attention.

Article source: http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/127661/

Date: 15 May 2012

Veronika Pulišová, a Slovakian analyst, asks the
question in New Eastern Europe: If the Cold War is over, why is there still a country “between Europe
and Russia”?

Ukraine is still being referred to as a country
“between Europe and Russia” not only in ordinary public discourse and media but
by top officials and diplomats, those in the US, EU and Russia, first and
foremost, but also in Ukraine itself. Why there is such an “in-betweenness”,
two decades after the end of the Cold War?

In her opening remarks to the U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations hearings on Ukraine on February 1st, 2012, labelled “Ukraine
at a Crossroads: What’s at Stake for the US and Europe?”, the U.S. Senator for
New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen introduced Ukraine as one of the largest and most
strategically located countries on the European continent, literally and
figuratively lying “at the crossroads between Europe and Russia”. In a similar
vein, she was followed by a testimony by, Steven Pifer from the Brookings
Institution, in Washington DC, criticising President Viktor Yanukovych’s
domestic policies for seriously undermining Ukraine’s ability to balance its
relationship “between the West and Russia”.

Balance or buffer zone?

“With weaker relations with the West,” Pifer argues,
“Kyiv will find that it has less room for manoeuvre in its dealings with
Moscow”. By stating that the overall goal of the US and the EU policy should be
to face Yanukovych with the choice as clearly as possible and to crystallize
the choice in his mind, Pifer strictly juxtaposes Ukraine’s friendlier and
stronger relationship with what he calls “the West” on the one hand, with
closer ties with Russia on the other hand. One could easily continue to
enumerate examples where the US posited that Ukraine has to balance its
relations with East and West in terms of foreign and security policy.
Considering such a black-and-white dichotomy, it is understandable why Ukraine
is often denominated as a “grey zone” or “buffer zone”, and why Kanwal Sibal,
an Indian diplomat and the first grand doctor of philosophy in India, might be
right when he argued at the Kyiv Security Forum on April 20th 2012, that it
will take a long time for the multi-polar world to become a reality.

The question is why buffer zones like Ukraine, keeping
a safe distance between allegedly former enemies, have not disappeared after
the fall of the Iron Curtain. One can agree with Steven Pifer that Ukrainian
Presidents and their administrations “have generally sought a balance in their
foreign policy relationships between the West and Russia”. The balancing has
been a common bone of content in mutual “West-Ukraine-Russia” relations. But
one should also ask oneself whether the Ukraine has ever had another option but
to balance and make such choices.

Who and why has nourished the realistic vision of a
necessity to choose between the East and West? It is not just the United
States. Politicians or commentators from all around the world continue to
vehemently use the term “West” in their public appearances and keep the
East-West dichotomy or some kind of “a neo-Cold War mythology”
alive by referring to it directly or indirectly in international official and
public discourse, ordinarily translated into concrete actions. Despite
occasional showcases of the U.S.-Russia, EU-Russia reconciliation or attempts
to build “strategic partnerships”; crucial decisions like voting on the UN
Security Council resolutions and other important international moves like
building regional alliances have mostly reflected the traditional cleavage,
while both sides are well aware of it. Behaviour of power hubs in the current
EU’s Eastern neighbourhood in the realm of foreign and security policy,
including energy security issues, is just one example.

On the one hand, the EU and Russia declare and make
some steps to bind Ukraine closer to them (that tells us something about
genuineness of their growing together). On the other hand, neither of them is
eager enough to solve the country’s integration impasse and neither the
Euro-Atlantic community, nor Russia seems to be bothered the status-quo too
much. On some occasions, their interaction inappropriately bypasses Ukraine.
For instance, in relation to Russia’s pressure on Ukraine concerning the gas
market and trade, Ukraine’s hopes of being supported by the EU-established and
promoted Energy Community (of which Ukraine has become a full-fledged member)
in negotiations with Moscow has not met with reality. What
is more, Russian alternative pipeline projects (the South Stream and the Nord
Stream) backed by some political figures from the Energy Community member
states diminish the importance of Ukraine as an important energy transit
country.

Two decades after the end of the Cold War, the choice
Ukraine faces should not be posed as “between Europe and Russia” or “between
the West and Russia”, in other words, between the Euro-Atlantic integration
structures and counter-structures driven by Russia. After all, “[i]n many respects, this is a false
choice”. However, for Ukraine not to choose and stay
in-between as to the foreign, security and defence policy and alliances – the
way Ukraine pursues through declaring a so-called “non-block status” of the
country – is not only less meaningful but, taking into account the neo-Cold War
hints, coming to terms with being “a buffer zone” for an infinite time might be
more dangerous, as a matter of fact.

The country insecure(d)

In the summer 2010, Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s
Parliament) officially abandoned the country’s aspirations to join NATO, the
move connected to the adoption of the law on fundamentals of Ukraine’s domestic
and foreign policy by Yanukovych’s administration. According to the law,
Ukraine is claimed to be a European “non-block” (“non-aligned”) state, while
being interested in the continuation of a constructive co-operation with NATO
rather than in membership. There have been numerous discussions on what this
non-alignment means. I dare to claim that first and foremost, it is a
rhetorical construct to avoid irritating NATO and Russia. Despite some
Ukrainians’ (not only politicians’) wishful thinking, in no way it implies
neutrality of the country. Decision-makers have often behaved as if they were
preparing to be integrated with “the West” and Russia at the same time,
depending on the issue under discussion; they have checked for what both sides
are doing and reacted accordingly. By doing so, have not they themselves been
disproving a viability of their construct?

Another thing is, as one NATO official made the point, if
the non-bloc status meant neutrality, Ukraine should be prepared to defend
itself alone. But “non-bloc status or neutrality is costly” and
Ukraine cannot afford it – not only because of finances but due to the
geopolitics which (especially the incumbent) Ukrainian elites, strikingly
enough, sometimes formulate as their device rather than a setback.

In other words, as Nicu Popescu stated at the Kyiv
Security Forum, the Ukrainian government poses itself as being of crucial
importance for all the regional power hubs and expects them to “pay” for
winning Ukraine’s favour. They tend to proudly overemphasize the geopolitical
significance of the country and deem that Ukraine can live like Austria or
Switzerland which are deep inside Europe and not on its outskirts. The question
posed by the Ambassador and long-standing, continuously pro-EU figure in
Ukrainian politics, Mr. Tarasyuk, is thus very pertinent in this respect: “How
can Ukraine, in a non-bloc manner, [and constrained in terms of hard security]
resist the growing global challenges…?”

Despite official declarations that Yanukovych has made
in terms of EU integration as a main objective of Ukraine’s foreign policy; the
security guarantees provided by the EU integration, or, for this moment in case
of Ukraine, closer economic and political association with the EU, are
primarily of a soft nature: strong interdependence, unshakeable respect for the
rule of law, mutual trust and intensive co-operation, sharing, adherence to
common rules, norms and values of democracy and free market economy, and a good
portion of negotiation skills and diplomacy, above all that.

Diplomacy, or lack of it

Ukraine hardly falls into these categories. In fact,
it faces substantial difficulties to go along the EU-performed lines. There is
an essential problem in Ukraine even with the last category – diplomacy – which
could be nourished well, irrespective of the extent of association with the EU.
The very basic of diplomacy is communication and generally, Yanukovych’s
administration is somehow not capable of communicating properly. Ukrainian
elites refuse to communicate and expose themselves to questions, open
discussions and potential critical remarks not only by individuals such as
analysts and scholars from abroad but also to domestic interlocutors at lower
levels of politico-societal hierarchies. With a few exceptions, they usually
avoid making their contact details public or offering them personally. At the
moment, Ukrainian diplomacy adhering to the governmental structures is a master
in showing disrespect to others.

A recent vivid example is the 5th Kyiv Security Forum
in April 2012. Bernard Kouchner, Karel Schwarzenberg, Nicu Popescu, Kanwal
Sibal and others from all around the world managed to come to Kyiv to discuss
Ukraine’s state of affairs in an international context but the incumbent
Ukrainian officials meant to speak somehow did not. The Kyiv Security Forum
thus went without “official Kyiv”. One can also recall numerous occasions where
Ukraine’s state “cream of the crop” representatives have appeared, made
statements, held dialogue with Brussels, Moscow and other capitals, but have
caused an outrage by their performance.

Paradoxically, it is Ukraine where such diplomacy
aspires to manage the country’s impasse and guarantee its security with its
skills alone.

Veronika Pulišová is a research assistant and PhD
student at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations,
Comenius University in Bratislava.

The author’s work has been supported by the Ryoichi
Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund (SYLFF). She would also like to thank to
Ms. Iryna Bochar and the Open Ukraine Foundation for inviting her to the 5^th Kyiv
Security Forum.

http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/317

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Article source: http://www.cogo-news.eu/news_Betwixt-and-between_1913.html

Marla Holmes-Smith’s eyes filled with tears as she spoke about a child far away who’s waiting for his forever home, in her home.

“I saw his picture and fell in love, love at first sight,” she said.

Holmes-Smith and her husband, Charles, live in Enterprise and have 5-year-old twins, Evelyn and Freddie.  The child they’re adopting fromBulgaria, Frankie, is also nearly 5 and, like their son Freddie, has Down Syndrome. They hope to bring Frankie home in early 2013 after the adoption process is completed.

As part of that effort, the In His Image support group for parents of children and grown children with disabilities held a fashion show fundraiser called “Fashion for Frankie” Saturday at The Grace Place church, where the support group is based.

About 20 children, some of them with disabilities, participated in the show, which included a silent auction that helped raise money for the family’s adoption expenses. The fundraiser collected $1,165.

Marla first learned about Frankie and considering adopting him through Ozark resident Shelley Bedford, who has eight children, five of them with Down Syndrome. Bedford is a former special education teacher who worked with an Atlanta-based nonprofit special needs adoption ministry called Reece’s Rainbow to facilitate her adoptions.

Since 2007, she has welcomed one child from the Ukraine, one from Serbia and three from Bulgaria into her home. She also helps the organization with temporary foster care and helps spread the word about their mission to help special needs orphans find loving families.

In other countries, Bedford explained, children with disabilities are often institutionalized and are malnourished or die at a young age without proper medical care.

“To say that God broke our hearts for orphans would probably be an understatement,” she said.

Adoptions of this kind can cost a minimum $20,000, Bedford said, but they can be accomplished with church and community support. Alternatively, she said, there are other ways to help orphans here and abroad by donating money or supplies to reputable charities, or becoming certified for foster care, respite foster care or emergency placement through the Alabama Department of Human Resources.

Marla said her son Freddie has shown her the meaning of unconditional love, which she also hopes to share with Frankie.

“He’s been such a blessing in our lives,” she said. “He’s changed our hearts.”

Article source: http://www2.eprisenow.com/news/2012/may/15/fashion-show-propels-family-toward-adoption-ar-3796900/

Ciena^®
Corporation (NASDAQ: CIEN), the network specialist, today announced that
global telecoms service provider VimpelCom
has deployed Ciena’s 100G coherent optical networking technology in its
backbone network. Equipped with Wavelogic™
optical processors and stretching more than 580 kilometers on a critical
route in central Russia, the high-speed link has been put in place to
help VimpelCom cope with the increased bandwidth requirements that the
operator is experiencing in its network core.

Key Facts:

• VimpelCom has deployed Ciena’s 6500
  Packet-Optical Platform in its backbone network in Russia. With
  the deployment of 100G technology, VimpelCom addresses the capacity
  constraints it has been facing as a result of increasing adoption of
  bandwidth-heavy services, such as cloud computing and mobile video,
  among its consumer and business customers.
• The new 100G link, which connects the Russian cities of Ufa and Samara
  through 587 kilometers of optical fiber, is an extension of
  VimpelCom’s existing Ciena-powered 40G network, with 100G wavelengths
  carrying live traffic and operating alongside 40G signals. The ability
  to simultaneously put 40G and 100G on the same system helps VimpelCom
  resolve the capacity crunch on its network and allows for seamless
  upgrades to higher data throughputs as and when the need arises.
• In addition, the Ciena 100G technology protects VimpelCom’s existing
  investment in fiber infrastructure, by allowing a significant increase
  in data transfer volume without the need for costly deployment of new
  fiber routes.
• The deployment was carried out in close cooperation with Ciena’s
  Platinum BizConnect
  partner ADV Consulting, which was instrumental in the implementation
  phase of the project. ADV Consulting’s expertise served VimpelCom in
  deploying Ciena’s 100G equipment in a live network alongside existing
  40G channels ensuring that traffic was not disrupted as the new
  technology was introduced.

Executive Comments:

• “As our customers have over the last few years become increasingly
  sophisticated in their use of devices and services, the traffic on our
  backbone network has grown exponentially. As a service provider in the
  leading edge of technology adoption, we are committed to ensuring that
  we have the latest technology at our disposal to address our needs,
  which has led us to deploying Ciena’s market-leading 100G solution.
  The ease with which the network extension was performed not only
  showed that any of our bandwidth constraint issues can be solved in an
  easy and truly non-invasive manner, but also proved that our
  infrastructure can scale as and when we need it to, in order to meet
  our customers’ future demands.”
  - Alexey Sapunov, Transport
  Network Director, OJCS VimpelCom

• “The claim of leadership in the deployment of a technology requires
  that the differentiating quality solves a tangible business challenge.
  VimpelCom’s 100G network is, to our knowledge, the first long-haul
  100G network deployed in the Russian Federation – but much more
  importantly, it helps the operator effectively address the very real
  issue of capacity demand, which in today’s era of sharp rises in
  broadband services many operators have become acutely aware of.”
  -
  Sergei Fishkin, regional managing director, Russia, CIS and the
  Baltics at Ciena

Technology Background:

• Ciena’s WaveLogic coherent optical processors enable operators to
  maximize the reach, capacity and flexibility of networks by enabling
  seamless upgrades to 40G/100G and beyond. Using innovative coherent
  receiver, high-speed analog to digital, and custom digital signal
  processing technology that integrates intelligence into the equipment,
  Ciena’s technology offers ease-of-deployment, cost efficiency and
  network investment protection.
• The pioneer and market leader of coherent optical technology, Ciena
  has shipped more than 14,000 coherent 40G/100G line interfaces to over
  120 customers across the globe.

Supporting Resources:

• Coherent Application Note: Coherent
  Optical Processing for High-Capacity Networks
• Data Sheet: 6500
  Packet-Optical Platform
• Video: What
  is Coherent Optical Networking?
• Blog: Proving
  That 100G is Real Today

About VimpelCom

VimpelCom is one of the world’s largest integrated telecommunications
services operators offering a wide range of wireless, fixed, and
broadband services in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos,
Algeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Central African
Republic, Italy and Canada. VimpelCom’s operations around the globe
cover territory with a total population of approximately 864 million
people. VimpelCom provides services under the “Beeline”, “Kyivstar”,
“djuice”, “Wind”, “Infostrada” “Mobilink”, “Leo”, “banglalink”,
“Telecel”, and “Djezzy” brands. As of December 31, 2011 VimpelCom had
205 million mobile subscribers on a combined basis. VimpelCom is traded
on the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol (VIP). For more
information visit: http://www.vimpelcom.com.

About Ciena

Ciena is the network specialist. We collaborate with customers worldwide
to unlock the strategic potential of their networks and fundamentally
change the way they perform and compete. With focused innovation, Ciena
brings together the reliability and capacity of optical networking with
the flexibility and economics of Ethernet, unified by services and
software that delivers the industry’s leading network automation. We
routinely post recent news, financial results and other important
announcements and information about Ciena on our website. For more
information, visit www.ciena.com.

Note to Ciena Investors

Forward-looking statements. This press release contains certain
forward-looking statements based on current expectations, forecasts and
assumptions that involve risks and uncertainties. These statements are
based on information available to the Company as of the date hereof; and
Ciena’s actual results could differ materially from those stated or
implied, due to risks and uncertainties associated with its business,
which include the risk factors disclosed in its Report on Form 10-Q,
which Ciena filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March
8, 2012. Forward-looking statements include statements regarding Ciena’s
expectations, beliefs, intentions or strategies regarding the future and
can be identified by forward-looking words such as “anticipate,”
“believe,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “intend,” “may,” “should,”
“will,” and “would” or similar words. Ciena assumes no obligation to
update the information included in this press release, whether as a
result of new information, future events or otherwise.

Article source: http://www.sys-con.com/node/2277661